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Two-sided platforms are often coupled with exclusive hardware products that connect two sides of users,
the consumers of the hardware product (i.e., buyers) and the application developers (i.e., sellers). The
hardware product in the platform business model introduces three important issues that are not yet well
understood in the literature of platform pricing: potentially downward-trending production cost, product
quality improvements, and consumers’ strategic behaviors. Using analytical modeling, our study explicitly
factors in these issues in analyzing a monopoly platform owner’s two-sided pricing problem. The platform
sequentially introduces and prices quality-improving hardware products, for which the costliness of quality
may decrease. Strategic buyers make purchasing and upgrading decisions, which dynamically determines the
buyer-side network size. Meanwhile, the seller-side network size is determined endogenously. We find that, an
increase in the likelihood or magnitude of future costliness reduction raises the initial buyer-side price of the
low-quality product and lowers the seller-side fee. This strategy, in turn, creates an indirect intertemporal
effect that allows the platform to also raise the buyer-side price(s) of the product(s) sold later. These findings
contrast with conventional wisdom and provide an economic explanation for premium introductory pricing
of many platform products. Moreover, we find that strengthening the network effect can result in more
pronounced increases in the buyer-side prices.
Key words : Dynamic pricing; two-sided platforms; sequential innovation; network effects; strategic
consumers
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1. Introduction
For two-sided platforms, hardware product is often an integral part of the business model. Many
well-known platforms connect different groups of users through an exclusive hardware product.
Apple products, such as the iPads, iPhones, and Macbooks, bring together the two sides of the
platform – users and application developers. The platform hardware is essential such that the users
need to purchase the hardware in order to access the third-party applications. Similarly, Google’s
own smartphone Pixel serves as the platform for users and application developers. Amazon Kindle
allows readers to use the device for ebooks from different publishers. More recently, Amazon Echo,
the voice-enabled virtual assistant, is gaining popularity. Through Echo, users can access a myriad
of “Alexa Skills”, which are third-party applications created for Echo. By using voice commands
on Echo, users can also make purchases on Amazon.com from the third-party sellers.
When hardware plays a pivotal role in the business model, the platform owner’s two-sided strate-
gies are closely tied to the pricing of the hardware device. The iPhone, arguably the most influential
and revolutionary consumer electronic in the recent decade, leads Apple’s continuing success as a
platform owner. In a Bloomberg interview (Grobart 2013), the CEO of Apple Tim Cook spoke on
their product strategy: “We never had an objective to sell a low-cost phone. Our primary objec-
tive is to sell a great phone and provide a great experience, and we figured out a way to do it
at a lower cost.” His seemingly paradoxical statement suggests that Apple aims to sell a high-end
phone while also focusing on reducing costs. The emphasis on cost consideration leads to a series
of interesting questions: How does cost reduction affect platform pricing with a hardware device?
Does cost reduction facilitate or discourage high-end positioning of the platform product? How
do some other platform-specific characteristics such as network effects come into play? To answer
these questions, we need to consider the factors particular to hardware in the context of platform
pricing. In this paper, we construct a dynamic two-sided framework to address these questions,
accounting for the following factors: production cost, multi-period selling, and strategic consumers.
The production cost of hardware is clearly an important aspect of platform pricing, and its
dynamics should be factored into the pricing strategies. Studies on information products, including
those related to two-sided platforms, often consider the marginal cost to be zero, which may be
limiting for analyzing hardware-based platform business models. For this type of platforms, not
only does production cost affect pricing, it also tends to change over time, often with a downward
trend. The decreasing cost in part owes to the decreasing manufacturing cost. Platform owners can
also play a part in strategically reducing the cost through interactions with their suppliers.
The manufacturing cost, especially that for technology, can decline substantially over time.
Decades of academic and industry research has identified learning by doing as an important driver
in cost reduction. Starting with Arrow’s seminal work (Arrow 1962) that provides a theoretical
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basis for organization-level learning by doing, numerous studies ensued to understand the eco-
nomic impacts of learning by doing. In a recent discussion on this topic, Thompson (2012) draws
on the literature, “organizational learning was shown to affect dynamic pricing strategy because
production costs are expected to fall as cumulative production increases” (p. 205), emphasizing
the implications for pricing. The cost reduction is also evident in practice, such as the drastic 99
percent reduction in the cost of solar power in the recent years (Chandler 2018). Kavlak et al.
(2018) analyze the causes of such cost reduction and find policies that encourage innovation, scale
economies, and learning by doing to be especially important.
Aside from the cost reductions on the manufacturing side, the platform owner’s strategies in
optimizing relationships and contracts with suppliers can be effective in further reducing cost.
Apple is known for its success in managing supplier relationships. Its market position offers great
bargaining power against its suppliers, allowing Apple to secure a lower production cost for future
products (Goldman 2011). Apple also adjusted its operating model by taking the responsibility of
procuring parts and materials away from the manufacturers to eliminate the markup (Parker 2013),
and to allow the manufacturers to focus solely on assembling and production. This strategy not
only directly reduces costs, but also further shifts the bargain power away from the manufacturers
to Apple. The effectiveness of these cost cutting strategies is evident. The recent cost saving on
the iPhone XS Max is substantial compared to the cost of iPhone X. The upgrades of the core
components in the iPhone XS Max only added $20 to the bill of materials, whereas the retail price
increased by $100, compared to those of the iPhone X (Lam and Hong 2018). Furthermore, the
cost saving is not only reflected by the total component costs. With iPhone XS Max, the bill of
materials only made up 35.48 percent of the total cost, a reduction from the 37 percent for the
iPhone X (Bluesea Research 2018).
Because production cost is dynamic, it is important to study platform strategies in a multi-period
setting. The platform industry is highly innovative – while production cost changes over time,
hardware products also advance in quality. Since the release of the original Amazon Echo in 2015,
Amazon has integrated a smart home hub in the Echo Plus introduced in 2017. As the platform
rolls out different versions of the hardware product sequentially, its pricing strategy is dynamic,
to take into account the potential consumer market at the time of releasing a new version and the
changes in production cost. Moreover, if the platform chooses to continue offering the older version,
the co-existence of different versions requires more sophisticated dynamic pricing considerations.
Faced with the ever-changing platform market, the consumers are often strategic. With the
platform sequentially introducing quality-improving products, many consumers become savvy and
forward-looking. Their anticipation of future products often sparks wide discussions and generates
abundant information on the Internet, which allows consumers to strategically plan their purchases.
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Some consumers may choose to wait for the later version of the product, while others may purchase
the version that is currently available. Among the latter type of consumers, some may upgrade to
the later version when it is released. The platform needs to account for these different preferences
and price its products accordingly to optimally segment the consumer market.
With these three factors, we construct a framework that analyzes a monopoly platform’s dynamic
two-sided pricing strategy, when offering sequentially improving hardware products to consumers.
Our paper aims to answer the following questions: When facing strategic consumers and uncertain
cost reduction in the future, how does a monopoly platform set the prices for its quality-improving
hardware products and the seller-side fee? Is it optimal for the platform to continue offering the
low-quality product when the high-quality version is released? If the likelihood or magnitude of
costliness reduction increases, how would the platform adjust its two-sided pricing decision in
each period? Furthermore, we study the role of network effects in the impacts of future costliness
reduction on prices.
Our theoretical model captures sequential introductions of quality-improving products and
dynamic pricing decisions with uncertainty in cost reduction. The platform sets the buyer-side
price(s) for the hardware product(s) offered and the seller-side fee for joining the platform. The
buyers make strategic purchasing decisions. In a two-period time horizon, the low-quality product
is introduced in Period 1 and the high-quality product in Period 2. The platform also decides
whether to continue offering the low-quality product in Period 2. The hardware product is consid-
ered as a durable good, but the buyers have the option of upgrading an existing purchase when a
higher quality product is introduced.
We find that the platform always continues to offer the low-quality product in Period 2. Thus,
the low and high qualities co-exist in Period 2. The platform’s pricing problem is then to optimally
segment the buyer-side demand across the two periods and between the two qualities, while bal-
ancing the seller-side profit. We analytically derive the platform’s optimal buyer-side prices and
seller-side fee and further study the impacts of the likelihood and magnitude of costliness reduction
in Period 2 on the optimal decisions.
When the likelihood or magnitude of costliness reduction in Period 2 increases, the platform’s
optimal strategy in Period 1 is to capture less buyer-side demand and raise the buyer-side price.
The extent of the buyer-side demand captured initially is critical because it sets up the market
demand for the future. When the platform captures fewer buyers in Period 1, more potential buyers
are left for Period 2, where the expected market profitability increases because of the increased
likelihood or magnitude of costliness reduction. And the platform does so by raising the optimal
buyer-side price in Period 1, which also further exploits the higher-valuation buyers. This allows
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the platform to charge a premium on its introductory product. Meanwhile, the seller-side fee is
reduced because the shrunken buyer-side demand makes the platform less attractive to sellers.
Within Period 2, the likelihood and magnitude of costliness reduction have different impacts
on the buyer-side prices, depending on the direct and indirect effects created. The likelihood of
cost reduction has no direct effect on the buyer-side prices in Period 2 because the uncertainty
on cost reduction is realized at that time, rendering the likelihood irrelevant. Similarly, in the
scenario without cost reduction, the magnitude of costliness reduction exerts no direct effect on
price. Thus, the direct effect only exists for the magnitude of costliness reduction, in the scenario
where cost reduction does occur. And the direct effect simply drives down the buyer-side prices,
consistent with conventional wisdom. However, the platform’s strategy from Period 1 leaves more
potential buyers to Period 2, which results in an indirect effect in the opposite direction. Therefore,
an increase in the likelihood of cost reduction leads to higher buyer-side prices in Period 2, so does
an increase in the magnitude of reduction in the scenario without cost reduction. For the scenario
with cost reduction, if the indirect effect is dominant, a greater magnitude of reduction results in
higher buyer-side prices for both qualities of products in Period 2; and vice versa. Interestingly,
the high-quality product demand always increases while the low-quality product demand always
decreases with an increase in either the likelihood or magnitude of costliness reduction, regardless
of the platform’s pricing strategy.
The network effects experienced by both the high- and low-type of sellers further enhance the
impacts of the likelihood and magnitude of costliness reduction on the buyer-side prices and
demand. Regardless of the seller type, the network effect has a qualitatively consistent impact.
Specifically, when the network effect is stronger, the platform raises the buyer-side price in Period
1 more aggressively in response to the increase in likelihood or magnitude of costliness reduction;
as a result, the buyer-side demand in Period 1 also shrinks to a greater extent. The network effect
has the same impact on the buyer-side prices in Period 2 and the total buyer-side demand across
two periods when the buyer-side prices are raised with more costliness reduction. For the case in
which the platform lowers the buyer-side price in Period 2, a stronger network effect induces the
platform to do so less aggressively, and the buyer-side demand across both periods increases to
a lesser extent. The overall intuition is that strengthened network effect allows the platform to
generate the seller-side profit more effectively, so less buyer-side demand is needed.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature in Section 2.
Section 3 introduces the model. In Section 4, we solve the model to derive the optimal buyer-side
prices and seller-side fee, and discuss the findings. Section 5 presents the numerical studies based
on the model with network effects in both directions (buyer- to seller-side and seller- to buyer-side).
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. Related Literature
Our work is closely related to four streams of literature: two-sided platforms, sequential innovation,
strategic customers and dynamic pricing. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is among the
first to consider the dynamic pricing problem of a two-sided platform that sequentially introduces
innovative hardware devices in the presence of strategic consumers. We connect the insights from
these domains of knowledge to gain a deeper understanding of the dynamic platform problem.
The literature on two-sided platforms explores the platform’s pricing problem taking into con-
sideration network effects, user multi-homing, platform governance, and innovation. The earlier
works include Rochet and Tirole (2002), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Caillaud and Jullien (2003),
Parker and Alstyne (2005), and Armstrong (2006). Continuing from this line of literature, more
recent studies examine the innovation issues on platforms. Lin et al. (2011) study the innovation
race among sellers of a two-sided market. By analyzing innovation incentives and price competition
among sellers, they find the platform’s optimal two-sided pricing strategy. They show that the
seller-side fee may have a positive impact on sellers’ innovation incentives, while the buyer-side fee
slows down the innovation race. Boudreau (2012) conducts an empirical study on the effect of the
number of applications on software variety. He finds that an increase in the number of application
producers leads to an overall reduction in innovation incentives, which creates a tension with the
positive network effects assumed by many studies of two-sided markets. Hagiu (2009) accounts
for the effect of consumers’ preference for variety. He examines the effect of such variety on the
platform’s pricing strategies and discusses how the seller-side pricing structure influences the sell-
ers’ innovation incentives. These studies focus on innovations that drive the products offered by
sellers to buyers, whereas we devote our attention to the the platform’s strategies in managing the
innovative hardware market through two-sided pricing.
Although the studies on two-sided pricing models have been commonly based on static settings
to derive crisp insights and maintain analytical tractability, a growing body of research work
has begun to explore dynamic strategies in the platform context. Hagiu (2006) investigates price
commitment by a platform, where one side of the platform arrives before the other side. He finds
that the platform can attract the early-arrival side without committing to a low price for the late-
arrival side. Also allowing the consumer side to arrive first, Bhargava et al. (2013) examine the
platform’s product line expansion strategy with uncertainty on developer-side participation. They
find the dependencies of the expansion strategy on the fixed cost for expansion and uncertainty on
developer participation. Lin et al. (2011) study sellers’ dynamic innovation race to create products
for the platform market and find implications on the platform’s pricing decisions. Chou et al.
(2012) point out that supply chain operational costs may alter the conventional understanding
on platform subsidization strategies. Zhu and Lansiti (2012) consider forward-looking consumers
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and focus on a platform’s entry problem in competition with an incumbent, with constant quality.
Through both analytical modeling and empirical validation, they find that, when both the network
effect and consumers’ valuation for future applications are sufficiently low, a platform entrant may
capture its market with quality advantage. Whereas Zhu and Lansiti (2012) do not model the
platform owner’s prices, Dou et al. (2012) analytically study a platform’s pricing decision on the
buyer side. By comparing strategic buyers with myopic buyers, Dou et al. (2012) identify that the
two types of buyers exhibit different behaviors only when the platform owner operates a license
model or a limited-time freemium model with a positive switching cost.
Compared to the studies on dynamic platform pricing, we are more interested in the platform’s
dynamic acquisition of the buyer side market through quality-improving products while balancing
its profits on the other side. Our findings echo those in the related papers by also illustrating the
importance of product quality as well as the platform owner’s and buyers’ strategic considerations.
Furthermore, we emphasize other factors such as multi-product offering, quality improvements,
and the decreasing production cost. More recently, costs in the context of two-sided pricing is
receiving increasing attention. In our work, the production cost of platform products enters the
context of quality innovation. We show that its variability impacts the platform’s dynamic prices
and strategies in intertemporal market segmentation.
Network effects and other key elements of two-sided platforms have been considered in a variety
of contexts. Gilbert and Jonnalagedda (2011) anchor on the concept of “contingent product,” which
is the product that is required to consume a durable good (e.g., ink is the contingent product of
printer). They evaluate the lock-in strategy with consideration for strategic consumers and find that
the firm’s ability to commit to shutting down the production of the durable good plays an important
role. Bhargava and Choudhary (2004) study versioning strategies of a platform (“infomediary”
in their paper) that provides matching services for the two sides with the option of value-added
services. They find that it is optimal for the platform to offer two versions of matching services,
those with and without the value-added services, and that the versioning incentives are stronger
compared to a traditional seller as a result of network effects. Cheng et al. (2011) evaluate net
neutrality policies by studying the the broadband service provider as a platform, which charges a fee
to consumers and possibly also a price to the content provider side. By modeling two-sided pricing,
they find that abolishing net neutrality benefits the broadband service provider while taxing the
content providers; the change to consumer surplus further depends on the relative capabilities of
the content providers in generating revenues. Guo et al. (2013) further examine the net neutrality
problem by considering the broadband service provider’s options to also discriminate the consumer
side. Their findings emphasize the importance of the platform making strategic decisions on both
the content provider side and the consumer side simultaneously. Hao et al. (2017) focus on mobile
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advertising platforms and examine different strategies of the platform owner in pricing ads and
those of application developers in publishing ads. Chou et al. (2012) incorporate a new element of
supply chain operational costs into a two-sided pricing problem. Whereas the conventional theory
on platform subsidies may hold, in some cases the platform extracts surplus on both sides to offset
the supply chain costs.
Our paper is also related to the literature on sequential innovation. Our model builds on those
in Dhebar (1994) and Kornish (2001), which examine the problem of a durable-goods monopolist
selling low-quality and high-quality products in the first and second period, respectively. They
examine whether there exists an equilibrium pricing strategy when the pace of quality improvement
varies. Dhebar (1994) concludes that rapid quality improvement is not desirable even with the
option of upgrading the low-quality products, whereas Kornish (2001) shows that any large quality
improvement could be optimal under different parameter settings without offering the special
upgrading pricing in the second period. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) investigate how to optimally
introduce high technology products with an option of holding the low quality products until the
high quality products launch. They show that introducing low quality products before high quality
products may be still preferred. For topics on sequential innovation, Ramachandran and Krishnan
(2008) provide a detailed review.
A key component in most dynamic pricing models is strategic consumer behavior, that is, con-
sumers are forward-looking and may delay their purchases to maximize their utilities over time.
Researchers are often interested in how a monopolist optimally prices a single product over time.
Stokey (1979) and Bulow (1982) show that a monopolist is forced to price at the marginal cost;
Besanko and Winston (1990) prove that the optimal price decreases over time due to consumers’
strategic behavior. Levin et al. (2010) analytically illustrate that, for a monopolist offering a per-
ishable product, accounting for consumers’ strategic behaviors is critical for obtaining maximum
revenues. Our work emphasizes the role of production cost in the firm’s and consumers’ deci-
sions. We show that, with more reduction in future costliness, consumers’ strategic behaviors make
possible for the firm to raise the price(s) of the product(s) both initially and in the future.
Dynamic pricing strategies, including skimming or penetration pricing, have been extensively dis-
cussed in literature (Liu 2010, Spann et al. 2014). Textbook theories (Kotler and Armstrong 2012)
recommend the skimming strategy for differentiated products with sufficient consumer heterogene-
ity and the penetration strategy for price-sensitive markets with strong competition and network
effects. Essentially, they focus on the price trend over time, that is, how firms price their prod-
ucts dynamically under different market conditions. In contrast, we are interested in the dynamic
impacts of production cost on prices rather than the price comparison itself across different peri-
ods. Specifically, in our work, an increase in the initial price can result from a greater likelihood or
magnitude of future cost reduction, different from the economic mechanisms of price skimming.
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3. The Model
In this section, we will lay out the model setup for the platform, the buyer side and the seller side.
All agents have rational expectations and maximize their own payoff.
3.1. The Platform
Consider a monopoly two-sided platform owner that facilitates transactions between two groups of
users through a hardware product exclusively offered by the platform owner. In practice, a platform
always faces competition to some extent. We consider the monopoly case to focus on the platform’s
loyal consumers with limited competition. For example, most Apple users are reluctant to switch
to an Android platform. More importantly, this enables us to isolate the effect of production cost,
multi-period selling, and strategic consumers on the platform’s pricing decisions. The group of
users that are buyers join the platform by purchasing the hardware product; the other group
of users, sellers, provide the buyer side with applications that run on the hardware device. The
platform owner improves the quality of this hardware product sequentially: A low-quality version
L is released in Period 1, followed by a high-quality version H in Period 2.
Let qi denote the quality of product i= L,H. As in Liu and Zhang (2013), we take quality as
exogenously given to focus on the platform’s pricing problem. In our research context, the quality
of the platform hardware may be largely determined by the state-of-the-art technology.1 Following
the common assumption (Netessine and Taylor 2007), the production cost of the hardware device
is a convex function of quality with 0 < β1 < 1 denoting the costliness of quality in Period 1.
Since technology tends to become less costly over time, the unit costs in Period 1 and 2 are β1q
2
i
and (β1 − δ)q2i , respectively, where δ is the costliness reduction from Period 1 to Period 2. To
take into consideration the uncertainty of future costliness reduction in Period 2, the costliness
is either reduced or constant compared to that in Period 1. Specifically, δ is a random variable
with values denoted by δk, where k ∈ {r, c} denotes the state of the costliness reduction outcome.
With probability γ, δ takes on the value of δr ∈ (0, β1), and with probability 1− γ it is δc = 0,
where 0≤ γ ≤ 1. Furthermore, we follow the assumption adopted in the literature that innovation
is not “too rapid” such that quality only improves in absolute terms but not in present-value terms
(Liu and Zhang 2013). Mathematically, this implies that qL >αqH , where α∈ (0,1) is the common
per-period discount factor for all players. Violation of this condition would rule out the subgame-
perfect equilibrium for sequential product introduction (Dhebar 1994), implying that the optimal
pricing strategy may lead to consumer regret.
1 In some scenarios, quality may also be a result of innovation. While this is an interesting research agenda, an in-
depth analysis of the innovation problem warrants a separate research study. Thus, we assume quality is exogenous
in our work to focus on the two-sided pricing problem.
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The timeline of the events is as follows. In Period 1, only the low-quality product is available. The
platform sets the prices charged to both sides, namely, the selling price of product L, pL1, for the
buyer side and the entry fee s for the seller side. Then both the buyer- and seller-side demands are
realized. In Period 2, the outcome of costliness reduction is realized, and the high-quality product
is released. The platform decides whether to continue offering the low-quality product, and sets pH
for the new buyers of product H who have not made a purchase in Period 1, pU for the upgraders
who have purchased the low-quality product in Period 1 and will trade it in for the high-quality
version, and pL2 for product L if still offered. And again, the demands on both sides are realized.
As in the canonical model of vertical differentiation (e.g., Pan and Honhon 2012), the platform can
set the selling prices of the low-quality product so high that no consumers purchase it, which is
equivalent to not offering the low-quality product. Therefore, we can regard pH , pL2, and pU as the
platform’s only decision variables in Period 2, as these pricing decisions also effectively determine
whether the low-quality product is offered.
3.2. The Buyer Side
Consider a unit mass of buyers who are heterogeneous in their valuations (or willingness-to-pay)
for quality, θ, which follows a uniform distribution over [0,1]. The distribution of buyer valuation is
common knowledge to the platform and the buyers. A buyer with valuation θ receives utility θqi−pi
from purchasing the product with quality i for i= L,H. Without loss of generality, let a buyer’s
utility for not joining the platform (by not purchasing the hardware product) be zero. For the
hardware-based platform, buyers tend to base purchasing decisions primarily on their valuation for
the product quality; therefore, in the main model, we ignore the impact of the seller-side demand
on the buyers’ purchasing decisions. This simplification allows the model to remain tractable as we
examine the platform’s dynamic, two-sided pricing strategy. We relax this assumption in Section
5 and show that the results on the pricing strategies from the main model qualitatively hold.
Because the costliness reduction is uncertain, the platform sets the price of low-quality product
pL1 in Period 1 anticipating such uncertainty and sets the buyer-side prices in Period 2, p
k
L2, p
k
H ,
and pkU , where k ∈ {r, c}, based on the realized cost in Period 2.
Under the condition that innovation is not too rapid, the buyers with higher valuations purchase
the low-quality product in Period 1 at pL1 and have an opportunity to upgrade to the high-quality
product in Period 2. In Period 2, the remaining buyers who have not joined the platform may
purchase the high-quality product at pkH or the low-quality product, if offered, at p
k
L2. Again, k
denotes the outcome of the costliness reduction, as defined previously. The buyers who choose
to upgrade to the high quality receive credit for trading in the old version and are charged a
discounted price pkU < p
k
H . Accordingly, let θL1 denote the valuation of the buyer who is indifferent
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between buying the low-quality product in Period 1 and the high-quality product in Period 2;
Notice that here the buyer’s utility from buying the high-quality product in Period 2 accounts for
the uncertainty of the high-quality product price depending on whether the costliness reduction
occurs. θkU(≥ θL1) denotes the valuation of the buyer who has purchased the low-quality product
and is indifferent about whether to upgrade to the high-quality version in Period 2; θkH(< θL1)
denotes the buyer who is indifferent between purchasing the high- and low-quality products in
Period 2; and θkL2(≤ θkH) denotes the buyer who is indifferent between purchasing the low-quality
product and nothing in Period 2 (Figure 1). As suggested in the literature on sequential innovation
(Dhebar 1994, Kornish 2001), the indifferent buyers θL1, θ
k
U , θ
k
H , and θ
k
L2 must satisfy:
θL1qL− pL1 = α(θL1qH − γ ∗ prH − (1− γ) ∗ pcH), (1)
θkUqL− pL1 = θkU((1−α)qL +αqH)− pL1−αpkU , (2)
α(θkHqH − pkH) = α(θkHqL− pkL2), (3)
α(θkL2qL− pkL2) = 0. (4)
We can further rewrite Eq. (1) to Eq. (4) as:
θL1 =
pL1−α(γprH + (1− γ)pcH)
qL−αqH , (5)
θkU =
pkU
qH − qL , (6)
θkH =
pkH − pkL2
qH − qL , (7)
θkL2 =
pkL2
qL
. (8)
Given the characterization of the indifferent buyers, we can determine the demand for different
products as shown in Figure 1. Specifically, the buyers with valuation in [θL1,1] purchase the
low-quality product in Period 1, but only a proportion of these buyers, [θkU ,1], upgrade to the
high-quality product in Period 2. Among the remaining buyers, those with valuation in [θkL2, θ
k
H)
and [θkH , θL1) purchase the low- and high-quality product, respectively, in Period 2. Note that the
platform decides whether to continue offering the low-quality product in Period 2. If the platform
chooses to discontinue the low-quality product, the corresponding pricing decisions will imply
θkL2 = θ
k
H .
3.3. The Seller Side
In addition to the buyer-side prices, the platform charges a seller-side fee s in each period. For
analytical tractability, we assume the same entry fee in both periods, which coincides with the
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Figure 1 Indifferent Buyers and Market Segmentation
observation that the developers’ annual fees on the major platforms do not fluctuate with the
changing device quality.
Let us consider a potential seller-side market that has proportions z and 1− z of sellers that
derive high and low cross-side network effects, vh and vl, from the buyer-side demand, respectively.
In other words, the high-type sellers have a higher valuation for the buyer-side network size than the
low-type sellers, when participating on the platform. For the sellers of type j ∈ {l, h}, the surplus
for joining the platform is the following, based on the standard utility function from Armstrong
and Wright (2007):
aj + vjΘ−wjn− s, (9)
where aj is the seller’s intrinsic benefit from joining the platform, vjΘ is the utility from transacting
with the buyer side that has a network size of Θ, and wjn is the disutility from competition with
the other sellers. wj is the competition effect parameter and n denotes the seller-side network
size; thus, with more sellers joining the platform, the negative utility from competition amplifies.
Although the term on the competition effect is not present in the utility form in Armstrong and
Wright (2007), we introduced it in our model to also capture the competitive intensity.
The sellers’ intrinsic benefit of joining the platform describes their valuation aside from that
related to transacting with the buyer side (Armstrong and Wright 2007, Gold and Hogendorn 2016).
In the context of app/game development, these benefits may include learning associated with the
technological environment provided by the platform and identifying with the developer community
of the platform. The sellers may exhibit different degrees of valuation for such benefits. We let
each type of sellers be heterogeneous in their intrinsic benefit aj, which is uniformly distributed
between [0,1]. Thus, the sellers of type j joins the platform if
aj >wjn+ s− vjΘ, (10)
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which yields the proportion of participating sellers under type j: 1− (wjn+ s− vjΘ). The total
seller-side network size then consists of both types of sellers that join the platform, with the
potential seller market normalized to 1:
n= z [1− (whn+ s− vhΘ)] + (1− z) [1− (wln+ s− vlΘ)] . (11)
By solving for n, we obtain:
n=
(1− s) + (zvh + (1− z)vl) Θ
1 + (zwh + (1− z)wl) =
(1− s) + v¯Θ
1 + w¯
, (12)
where v¯= zvh + (1− z)vl and w¯= zwh + (1− z)wl.
The platform’s profit derived from the seller side in each period is given by snt, t = 1,2. In
each period, the buyer-side network size Θ may vary. Whereas in Period 1 only the buyers of the
low-quality product exert network effect onto the seller side, in Period 2 the buyers from both
periods may exert network effect because the sellers in Period 2 can interact with all buyers who
have purchased a hardware device.
4. Model Analysis and Results
We solve for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in this dynamic game, such that pkH , p
k
U , p
k
L2,
and the buyers’ purchasing decisions are all best responses at the start of Period 2 when pL1, s, and
θL1 are given. We analyze this subgame in Section 4.1. In Period 1, all players make forward-looking
decisions anticipating such subgame-perfect future strategies. This contrasts with the models of
committed pricing, in which the platform makes a static decision for both periods upfront without
further optimizing at the start of Period 2. The analysis and results of the optimal strategies are
presented in Section 4.2.
4.1. Period 2: Subgame Analysis
We first solve the Period 2 subgame taking the following as given: the low-quality product price
in Period 1 (pL1), the seller-side entry fee (s), and the valuation of the indifferent buyer between
purchasing the low-quality product in Period 1 and purchasing the high-quality product in Period
2 (θL1). In Period 2, for k ∈ {r, c}, the platform earns profits on (1) the high-quality product from
the first-time buyers2 with valuation [θkH , θL1] and the upgraders with valuation [θ
k
U ,1], (2) the low-
quality product from the buyers with valuation [θkL2, θ
k
H ], and (3) the sellers. Thus, for k ∈ {r, c},
the Period 2 profit function is:
Πk2(p
k
H , p
k
L2, p
k
U ;θL1) =
(
θL1− θkH
) [
pkH − (β1− δk)q2H
]
+ (1− θkU)
[
pkU − (β1− δk)q2H
]
2 The first-time buyers refer to the buyers who have not made any purchase in Period 1. Mathematically, the valuation
of a first-time buyer falls within the range [0, θL1].
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+(θkH − θkL2)
[
pkL2− (β1− δk)q2L
]
+ sn2
=
(
θL1− p
k
H − pkL2
qH − qL
)[
pkH − (β1− δk)q2H
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from first-time buyers of high-quality product
+
(
1− p
k
U
qH − qL
)[
pkU − (β1− δk)q2H
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from upgraders
+
(
pkH − pkL2
qH − qL −
pkL2
qL
)[
pkL2− (β1− δk)q2L
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from buyers of low-quality product
+s
(1− s) + v¯
(
1− pkL2
qL
)
1 + w¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from seller side
. (13)
The corresponding profit maximization problem is
max
pk
H
,pk
L2
,pk
U
Πk2(p
k
H , p
k
L2, p
k
U ;θL1) (14)
s.t.
pkL2
qL
≤ p
k
H − pkL2
qH − qL ≤ θL1 ≤
pkU
qH − qL ≤ 1 (15)
pkU ≤ pkH (16)
The constraint
pkL2
qL
≤ pkH−pkL2
qH−qL ≤ θL1 ≤
pkU
qH−qL ≤ 1 is to ensure well-defined consumer segments without
loss of generality (Pan and Honhon 2012). Moreover, the price to upgrade to the high-quality
product needs to be lower than the price for the first-time buyers of the high-quality product. The
necessary mathematical assumptions are presented in our analysis in Eq. (40) of Appendix A.
We first examine the product offerings in Period 2 and obtain the following result.
Proposition 1. The platform always offers both the high- and low-quality products in Period
2.
Proposition 1 shows that it is not optimal to discontinue the low-quality product after introducing
the high-quality product; mathematically, this implies that θk∗L2 =
pk∗L2
qL
< θk∗H =
pk∗H −pk∗L2
qH−qL , k ∈ {r, c}
always holds for any pL1, s and θL1. Even though offering the low-quality product may cannibalize
the demand for the high-quality product, the increased market size from the lower-valuation buyers
not only generates more buyer-side revenues, but also leads to additional revenues from the seller
side through the network effect. The overall revenue gains dominate the cannibalization effect;
thus, the platform always offers both products in Period 2. This offering strategy is often observed
in practice. For instance, the previous version of iPhone usually stays on the shelf when the new
iPhone is introduced. Also, Echo is still sold along with Echo Plus on Amazon.com.
We then derive the optimal prices:
pk∗H (s, θL1) =
qH((β1− δk)qH + θL1)− s v¯1+w¯
2
, (17)
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pk∗L2(s, θL1) =
qL((β1− δk)qL + θL1)− s v¯1+w¯
2
, (18)
pk∗U (s, θL1) =
(β1− δk)q2H + qH − qL
2
. (19)
Examining these prices leads to two interesting observations. First, the platform prices each product
independently. In other words, each optimal price (Eq. (17) and (18)) is only dependent on the
product’s own quality level, cost, and the seller-side fee. Second, in contrast, the optimal price for
the upgraders does depend on both quality levels, but does not factor in the seller-side fee or the
network effect. This is because these buyers already own the low-quality product from Period 1
and the quality improvement is essential in their purchasing decisions. Furthermore, regardless of
whether they upgrade to the high-quality product, they already exert network effect onto the seller
side; thus, their demand has no additional impact on the seller side.
We further analyze the prices in the following lemmas.
Lemma 1. When the highest buyer valuation in Period 2 (θL1) increases, the optimal price in
Period 2 for both the high- and low-quality products increases (i.e.,
∂pk∗H |s,θL1
∂θL1
> 0,
∂pk∗L2|s,θL1
∂θL1
> 0) .
Lemma 1 examines how the buyer-side prices in Period 2 depend on intertemporal market
segmentation. The highest buyer valuation in Period 2 is determined by the platform’s pricing
decisions in Period 1, given buyers’ rational expectations on the future prices. In effect, it is the
platform’s key decision in segmenting the buyer-side market between the two periods. If fewer
buyers make purchases in Period 1, not only does the potential demand in Period 2 increase, the
highest buyer valuation in Period 2 also increases. The latter incentivizes the platform to exploit
the high-valuation buyers through increased prices. We refer to this strategy of raising price to
further extract rent from the buyers with higher valuation as value-driven pricing, which may
actually exclude some lower-valuation buyers and reduce demand. This strategy plays a central
role in the subgame-perfect equilibrium results presented in Section 4.2.
Lemma 2. In Period 2, if the costliness of production is reduced, the direct effect of costliness
reduction drives down the buyer-side prices (i.e.,
∂pr∗H |s,θL1
∂δr
< 0,
∂pr∗U |s,θL1
∂δr
< 0,
∂pr∗L2|s,θL1
∂δr
< 0) and
results in more demand for the high-quality product in terms of both the first-time buyers and
the upgraders (i.e.,
∂(θL1−θr∗H )|s,θL1
∂δr
> 0,
∂(1−θr∗U )|s,θL1
∂δr
> 0). However, the demand for the low-quality
product in Period 2 decreases (i.e.,
∂(θr∗H −θr∗L2)|s,θL1
∂δr
< 0).
The direct effect of the costliness reduction on price in Period 2 follows the conventional wisdom
– lower costliness reduces the buyer-side prices for both products. As a result, the demand generally
increases. The exception is the demand for the low-quality product in Period 2, which decreases
even though the price drops with the reduced costliness. The reason lies in the relative price changes
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at the two quality levels. Because costliness measures the cost for each unit of quality, the costliness
reduction leads to more cost savings for the high-quality product (δrq2H) than for the low-quality
product (δrq2L). Therefore, the optimal pricing strategy allocates some buyers who would otherwise
purchase the low-quality product to the high-quality product, resulting in the shrunken low-quality
demand.
It is important to note that lower prices with reduced costliness is particular to only Period 2.
Given that both the buyers and the platform are forward-looking and have rational expectations,
anticipating the possibility of costliness reduction in Period 2 could also impact the platform’s
strategies in Period 1 (pL1 and s), which in turn alters the indifferent buyer (θL1) that is taken as
given here. As the indifferent buyer (θL1) changes, the buyer-side prices and demand in Period 2
would respond to the costliness reduction differently. We further explore these effects in Section
4.2 by analyzing the subgame-perfect equilibrium results.
4.2. Period 1: Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
In Period 1, anticipating the subgame-perfect strategy, the platform sets the selling prices to
maximize the total profit over the two periods, including the profits from the buyer and seller sides
in Period 1 and the discounted expected profit from Period 2. Note that, according to Eq. (12),
the seller-side demand in Period 1 is given by
n1 =
(1− s) + v¯(1− θL1)
1 + w¯
. (20)
The platform’s profit function can be expressed as:
Π1(s, pL1) = (1− θL1)(pL1−β1q2L) + sn1 + γ[αΠr2(pr∗H , pr∗L2, pr∗U )] + (1− γ)[αΠc2(pc∗H , pc∗L2, pc∗U )]
=
(
1− pL1−α(γp
r∗
H + (1− γ)pc∗H )
qL−αqH
)
(pL1−β1q2L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from the buyer-side in Period 1
+ s
(1− s) + v¯(1− θL1)
1 + w¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from the seller-side in Period 1
+α[γΠr2(p
r∗
H , p
r∗
L2, p
r∗
U ) + (1− γ)Πc2(pc∗H , pc∗L2, pc∗U )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discounted expected profit from Period 2
(21)
The first period profit maximization problem is
max
s,pL1
Π1(s, pL1) (22)
s.t.
pL1−α(γpr∗H + (1− γ)pc∗H )
qL−αqH ≤ 1. (23)
Substituting Eq. (17) to (19) into the Period 2 profit function (13) and solving the above total
profit maximization problem give the optimal buyer-side price and seller-side fee in Period 1. Due
to the complexity of the derivation, we relegate the analytical details to the Appendix A.2..
In the following, we study the comparative statics of the optimal prices with respect to the
likelihood and magnitude of costliness reduction (i.e., γ and δr respectively) in Period 2. Note that
γ captures the degree of uncertainty for cost reduction, while δr quantifies the reduction.
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Proposition 2. When expecting a higher likelihood or a higher magnitude of costliness reduc-
tion in Period 2, the platform raises the buyer-side price in Period 1 (i.e.,
dp∗L1
dγ
>0,
dp∗L1
dδr
>0). This
in turn reduces the buyer-side demand in Period 1, which raises the highest buyer valuation in
Period 2 (i.e.,
dθ∗L1
dγ
> 0,
dθ∗L1
dδr
> 0).
When the platform anticipates a greater likelihood of costliness reduction or more costliness
reduction in Period 2, it is optimal to start adjusting the buyer-side price in Period 1. Essentially,
an increase in either parameter leads to a higher expected profitability in Period 2. A greater
likelihood of costliness reduction shifts the weight from the outcome of no cost change to that of
cost reduction, which results in increased profitability; more costliness reduction further raises the
the increase in profitability in case of cost reduction. Thus, both create an incentive to allocate
more potential buyers to Period 2, which is achieved by raising the optimal buyer-side price in
Period 1. Facing an increased price in Period 1, only the buyers with sufficiently high valuation
purchase at this early stage. Even though the buyer-side demand is then reduced, the platform is
able to extract more surplus from these buyers. In sum, anticipating a greater likelihood of cost
reduction or more costliness reduction in Period 2 leads the platform to pursue the value-driven
pricing strategy in Period 1, which then increases the highest valuation of the potential buyers
remaining for Period 2.
In practice, platforms tend to set a high introductory price to market their initial hardware
product as a premium device. Both the first iPhone and the first iPad had a steep price tag
of US$499 (for the 4GB iPhone model and the 16GB iPad model), despite the limited features
compared to the later versions (Wikipedia 2019b, Smith and Evans 2010). Amazon also took the
similar strategy of pricing the first Kindle at US$399 (Wikipedia 2019a). Setting an initial high
price point helps to position the product in the market of high-valuation buyers. As these companies
usually expect production to be more effective for the following versions of the products, they would
have more long-term gain by leaving more consumers for the later version. Our finding suggests
that the more the platforms expect to have cheaper production or to lower production cost later on,
the higher they may price the initial product. In this regard, our finding is seemingly related to the
concept of skimming pricing that a high initial price captures the high-valuation consumers first.
However, an importance difference is that, while skimming pricing describes a strategy of market
segmentation with sequentially introduced products, our finding illustrates the platform’s strategic
response to the anticipated changes in the future production cost. In other words, skimming pricing
focuses on the decreasing price trend over time, whereas we investigate how the platform’s pricing
strategy in each stage responds to potential production cost reductions. The economic mechanism
in our results is, in fact, drastically different compared to that for skimming pricing.
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Proposition 3. When expecting a higher likelihood or a higher magnitude of costliness reduc-
tion in Period 2, the platform lowers the seller-side fee (i.e., ds
∗
dγ
< 0 and ds
∗
dδr
< 0).
Proposition 3 shows that the platform’s pricing strategy on the seller side is the reverse of that
on the buyer side, when either of the cost reduction parameter increases; that is, while the platform
raises the optimal buyer-side price (
dp∗L1
dδr
>0 in Proposition 2), it lowers the optimal seller-side fee.
As the increased buyer-side price reduces the buyer-side demand in Period 1, the network size
for attracting the sellers is smaller. Therefore, the platform needs to lower the seller-side fee in
compensation. This is related to the “seesaw principle” discussed in Rochet and Tirole (2006),
which suggests that a factor that raises the price on one side tends to reduce the price on the other
side as a result of the linkage between the two sides.
The results from Propositions 2 and 3 discuss the cross-period cost-price effect – it is important
for the platform to consider its pricing strategy at the current time while anticipating changes in
cost in the future. Such consideration is complex especially when consumers are strategic, as their
purchasing timing responds to the price changes. Therefore, the platform must carefully project its
market segmentation across the time horizon based on the profitability levels in different periods.
Our model illustrates the counterintuitive result that more future costliness reduction incentivizes
the platform to raise the current price, which allows the platform to execute the strategy of value-
driven pricing.
We now examine the impacts of the likelihood and the magnitude of costliness reduction on
the optimal prices in Period 2, while taking into account the platform’s strategies in Period 1.
First, let us examine the comparative statics of the prices with respect to the two parameters. The
comparative statics with respect to the magnitude of costliness reduction δr depend on whether
the cost reduction occurs:
dpr∗H
dδr
=
∂pr∗H
∂δr
+
∂pr∗H
∂s
ds∗
dδr
+
∂pr∗H
∂θL1
dθ∗L1
dδr
=
∂pr∗H
∂δr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect (-)
− v¯
2(1 + w¯)
ds∗
dδr
+
qH
2
dθ∗L1
dδr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect (+)
(24)
dpr∗L2
dδr
=
∂pr∗L2
∂δr
+
∂pr∗L2
∂s
ds∗
dδr
+
∂pr∗L2
∂θL1
dθ∗L1
dδr
=
∂pr∗L2
∂δr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect (-)
− v¯
2(1 + w¯)
ds∗
dδr
+
qL
2
dθ∗L1
dδr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect (+)
(25)
dpc∗H
dδr
=
∂pc∗H
∂δr
+
∂pc∗H
∂s
ds∗
dδr
+
∂pc∗H
∂θL1
dθ∗L1
dδr
=
∂pc∗H
∂δr︸︷︷︸
Direct effect (0)
− v¯
2(1 + w¯)
ds∗
dδr
+
qH
2
dθ∗L1
dδr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect (+)
> 0 (26)
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dpc∗L2
dδr
=
∂pc∗L2
∂δr
+
∂pc∗L2
∂s
ds∗
dδr
+
∂pc∗L2
∂θL1
dθ∗L1
dδr
=
∂pc∗L2
∂δr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect (0)
− v¯
2(1 + w¯)
ds∗
dδr
+
qL
2
dθ∗L1
dδr︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect (+)
> 0 (27)
The comparative statics with respect to the likelihood of costliness reduction γ are the same for
k ∈ {r, c}:
dpk∗H
dγ
=
∂pk∗H
∂γ
+
∂pk∗H
∂s
ds∗
dγ
+
∂pk∗H
∂θL1
dθ∗L1
dγ
=
∂pk∗H
∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect (0)
− v¯
2(1 + w¯)
ds∗
dγ
+
qH
2
dθ∗L1
dγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect (+)
> 0 (28)
dpk∗L2
dγ
=
∂pk∗L2
∂γ
+
∂pk∗L2
∂s
ds∗
dγ
+
∂pk∗L2
∂θL1
dθ∗L1
dγ
=
∂pk∗L2
∂γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Direct effect (0)
− v¯
2(1 + w¯)
ds∗
dγ
+
qL
2
dθ∗L1
dγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect effect (+)
> 0 (29)
In the scenario where cost reduction occurs, Eq. (24) and (25) show that the magnitude of
costliness reduction affects the buyer-side prices both directly and indirectly. Lemma 2 states that
the direct effect is to lower the buyer-side prices in Period 2. However, the indirect effect is positive
and stems from the platform’s value-driven pricing in Period 1. Intuitively, two forces are in play:
First, when the platform implements the value-driven pricing strategy in Period 1, the highest
buyer valuation in Period 2 increases (
dθ∗L1
dδr
> 0 in Proposition 2), which allows the platform to raise
the prices (
∂pk∗H |s,θL1
∂θL1
> 0 and
∂pk∗L2|s,θL1
∂θL1
> 0 in Lemma 1); second, the value-driven pricing strategy
shifts emphasis away from the seller side (Proposition 3), which also offers an opportunity to raise
the buyer-side prices. Overall, the net effect from the direct and indirect effects further depends
on certain conditions, which are analyzed in the following propositions. For the scenario without
any cost reduction (i.e., δ = 0) in Period 2, the direct effect simply vanishes, but the magnitude of
costliness reduction still exerts an indirect effect on the prices (Eq. (26) and (27)).
As illustrated by Eq. (28) and (29), the likelihood of costliness reduction affects the buyer-side
prices in Period 2 differently compared to the magnitude of costliness reduction, in that the direct
effects are absent regardless of whether cost reduction occurs. At the start of Period 2 the outcome
of cost reduction is already realized, so the likelihood becomes irrelevant, eliminating the direct
effect. However, the positive indirect effects still persist and follow the similar mechanisms as those
for the magnitude of costliness reduction described above.
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Proposition 4. When the likelihood of cost reduction γ increases, the platform sets a higher
optimal buyer-side price for both products in Period 2 (i.e.,
dpk∗H
dγ
>0 and
dpk∗L2
dγ
>0 for k ∈ {r, c}).
However, the optimal upgrade price is not affected (i.e.,
dpk∗U
dγ
=0 for k ∈ {r, c}).
When the magnitude of costliness reduction δr increases, the optimal pricing strategies for the
two scenarios of cost reduction are the following:
• For the scenario without cost reduction, the platform’s pricing strategies follow those under
the likelihood of cost reduction: the optimal prices of the two products are higher (i.e.,
dpc∗H
dδr
>0 and
dpc∗L2
dδr
>0), and the optimal upgrade price is not affected (i.e.,
dpc∗U
dδr
=0).
• For the scenario with cost reduction, the platform sets a higher buyer-side price for both prod-
ucts (i.e.,
dpr∗H
dδr
>0 and
dpr∗L2
dδr
>0), when the network effect is sufficiently strong or the quality gap is
sufficiently wide; otherwise, the platform lowers the price for both products. Moreover, the platform
sets a lower upgrade price in Period 2 (i.e.,
dpr∗U
dδr
<0).
In Period 2, the platform can also employ the strategy of value-driven pricing and raise prices,
driven by to the indirect effects coming from Period 1 illustrated by Eq. (24) to (29). An increase
in either the likelihood or the magnitude of costliness reduction creates a positive indirect effect
by raising the highest buyer valuation for Period 2 (through raised buyer-side price in Period 1,
Proposition 2 and Lemma 1) and by reducing the seller-side fee in Period 1 (Proposition 3). Thus,
the impacts of the likelihood or the magnitude of costliness reduction on the buyer-side prices in
Period 2 depend on how the indirect effect weighs relative to the other effects, if present.
The likelihood of cost reduction does not directly affects the platform’s strategies in Period 2
because once the outcome of cost reduction is realized in Period 2, the likelihood is irrelevant.
As such, only the indirect effect from Period 1 plays a role in the pricing strategies in Period 2.
Specifically, through the indirect effects, an increase in the likelihood of cost reduction enhances
the platform’s incentive to execute the value-driven pricing strategy in Period 1 (Proposition 2),
and consequently in Period 2 (as shown by Eq. (28) and (29)), leading to a higher buyer-side price
for both qualities of products in Period 2.
If cost reduction does not occur in Period 2, the magnitude of reduction is also irrelevant for the
direct effect. Thus, in this scenario, the impacts of the magnitude of costliness reduction on the
prices of two qualities of products and the upgraders follow the same intuition discussed for the
likelihood of reduction.
On the other hand, for the scenario where the cost reduction does occur, the magnitude of reduc-
tion exerts an additional negative direct effect on some of the prices (Eq. (24) and (25)). The net
effect of the direct and indirect effects depends on other conditions. When the network effect is suf-
ficiently strong or the quality gap is sufficiently wide, the platform sets a higher optimal buyer-side
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price for both products. Given a strong network effect, the platform could rely less on generating
a high buyer-side demand; and the value-driven pricing strategy in Period 1, which narrows the
buyer-side demand to the higher-valuation buyers, would be executed more aggressively. A larger
quality gap implies greater value offering of the high-quality product in Period 2, which encourages
the allocation of potential buyers from Period 1 to Period 2. Therefore, both a strong network effect
and a large quality gap allow the platform to more aggressively pursue the value-driven pricing
strategy in Period 1, which then strengthens the indirect effect in Eq. (24) and (25) and facilitates
the value-driven pricing strategy in Period 2 as well.
The value-driven pricing strategy only applies to the first-time buyers, not the upgraders, which
differ from the first-time buyers in two ways. First, the demand for upgrades does not impact
the seller side because these buyers are already part of the network regardless of their upgrading
decisions. Second, the valuation of these buyers is less sensitive to the buyer allocation between the
two periods; thus, the upgrade pricing is not contingent on the value-driven pricing strategy from
Period 1, which then removes the indirect effect discussed above. As a result, the upgrade pricing
has little dependency on the other pricing strategies and simply maximizes the profit that can be
extracted from the buyer segment that already owns the low-quality product with purchases from
Period 1. In the absence of the indirect effect, the likelihood of cost reduction has no effect on
the upgrading price in Period 2; similarly, for the scenario without cost reduction, the magnitude
of reduction also does not affect the upgrading price. However, in the scenario where the cost
reduction does occur, the direct effect of the magnitude of reduction leads to a lower upgrading
price in Period 2.
The finding that more costliness reduction may lead to higher prices is in sharp contrast with
conventional wisdom. The conventional relationship of lower cost leads to lower price holds in a
static setting, where a firm is committed to its pricing strategy. When the cost drops, the firm is
better off lowering the price to gain a larger market share. Dynamic pricing alters this economic
mechanism, because the platform can optimize its pricing strategy again in the future. The value-
driven pricing strategy allows the platform to repeatedly leverage on the high-valuation buyers to
raise prices. Further exploiting those buyers in Period 1 sets up more high-valuation buyers for
Period 2, which may again lead to increased prices under appropriate conditions.
Proposition 4 underscores that, in a dynamic context, the within-period cost-price effect is not
straightforward, as we need to account for the indirect effect that results from the anticipatory
strategic decisions in an earlier period. To understand the overall within-period cost effect on price,
it is important to consider the factors that affect the platform’s anticipatory strategies. We show
that, in our model, both the network effect and the product quality improvement can play a role
in determining the platform’s decisions.
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Proposition 5. An increase in the likelihood of cost reduction γ leads to more demand for the
high-quality product in terms of the first-time buyers (i.e.,
d(θ∗L1−θk∗H )
dγ
> 0). The demand for the
upgraders is unaffected (i.e.,
d(1−θk∗U )
dγ
= 0). The demand for the low-quality product in Period 2 and
the total demand across two periods are reduced (i.e.,
d(θk∗H −θk∗L2)
dγ
< 0 and
d(1−θk∗L2)
dγ
< 0).
An increase in the magnitude of costliness reduction δr also leads to more demand for the high-
quality product in terms of the first-time buyers (i.e.,
d(θ∗L1−θk∗H )
dδr
> 0) and reduced demand for the
low-quality product in Period 2 (i.e.,
d(θk∗H −θk∗L2)
dδr
< 0). Moreover,
• in the scenario without cost reduction, the demand for the upgraders is unaffected (i.e.,
d(1−θc∗U )
dδr
= 0). And the total demand across two periods is always reduced (i.e.,
d(1−θc∗L2)
dδr
< 0);
• in the scenario with cost reduction, the demand for the upgraders is increased (i.e., d(1−θ
r∗
U )
dδr
>
0). And the total demand across two periods is reduced (i.e.,
d(1−θr∗L2)
dδr
< 0) when the network effect
is sufficiently strong or the quality gap is sufficiently wide; and reverse holds.
As either the likelihood or the magnitude of costliness reduction increases, the platform’s pricing
strategies described in Proposition 4 shift the buyer demand towards the high-quality product,
because these cost parameters lead to more profitability increase for the higher quality product.
Specifically, recall that costliness reduction impacts the cost of producing each unit of quality,
resulting in more total cost reduction for the high-quality product. Thus, the demand for first-time
buyers of the high-quality product increases. Meanwhile, the buyer-side demand for the low-quality
product is reduced due to the relative prices of the two qualities.
For the impact of the magnitude of costliness reduction under the scenario with cost reduction,
while the changes in the buyer-side demand for the two products in Period 2 do not depend on
any conditions (such as those for the pricing strategies in Proposition 4), the changes in the total
buyer-side demand across the two periods are contingent on the network effect or quality gap. In
particular, a higher magnitude of reduction reduces the total buyer-side demand given sufficiently
strong network effect or sufficiently wide quality gap. Following the intuition for Proposition 4,
sufficiently strong network effect or wide quality gap allows the platform to rely less on a large
buyer-side market and pursue value-driven pricing in both periods. As the platform focuses more
on exploiting the high-valuation buyers rather than attracting more buyers, the total demand tends
to decrease with costliness reduction. When neither condition holds, the platform would set prices
such that the total buyer-side demand increases with more costliness reduction.
In the scenario without cost reduction, the increased magnitude of reduction always reduces
the total demand; the same applies when the likelihood of cost reduction increases. As explained
for Proposition 4, for these cases, the indirect effects are not offset by the direct effect; thus, the
platform’s incentive to raise price and pursue the value-driven strategy is sufficiently strong without
the conditions of network effect or quality gap.
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The demand for upgrades follows from the pricing strategies described in Proposition 4. As
the likelihood of cost reduction increases, the upgrading price is not affected; thus, the demand
is unchanged. The same result applies in the scenario without cost reduction as the magnitude
of reduction increases. In the scenario where cost reduction does occur, a greater magnitude of
reduction leads to more upgrade demand because the optimal upgrading price is reduced.
Proposition 6. The network effects (experienced by both the low- and high-type sellers, i.e.,
vl or vh) play a role in the impacts of the likelihood and the magnitude of costliness reduction
on the platform’s strategies. As the network effect on either the low- or high-type seller, vl or vh,
strengthens, the following applies:
i. The platform more aggressively raises the buyer-side price (i.e.,
∂2p∗L1
∂δr∂vj
> 0 and
∂2p∗L1
∂γ∂vj
> 0 for
j ∈ {l, h}) and lowers the seller-side fee in Period 1 (i.e., ∂2s∗
∂δr∂vj
< 0 and ∂
2s∗
∂γ∂vj
< 0 for j ∈ {l, h})
when the likelihood or the magnitude of costliness reduction increases. The shift of the buyer-side
demand from Period 1 to Period 2 is also more pronounced (i.e.,
∂2(1−θ∗L1)
∂δr∂vj
< 0 and
∂2(1−θ∗L1)
∂γ∂vj
< 0
for j ∈ {l, h}).
ii. The platform more (less) aggressively raises (reduces) the buyer-side price for both qualities
of product in Period 2 (i.e.,
∂pr∗H
∂δr∂vj
> 0 ,
∂2pk∗L2
∂δr∂vj
> 0,
∂pr∗H
∂δr∂vj
> 0 , and
∂2pk∗L2
∂δr∂vj
> 0 for j ∈ {l, h} and
k ∈ {r, c}), when the likelihood or the magnitude of costliness reduction increases. The reduction
(increase) of the total market size across both periods is also more pronounced (i.e.,
∂2(1−θk∗L2)
∂δr∂vj
< 0
and
∂2(1−θk∗L2)
∂γ∂vj
< 0 for j ∈ {l, h} and k ∈ {r, c}).
iii. The increase in the market size of the first-time buyers for the high-quality product is more
pronounced (i.e.,
∂2(θ∗L1−θk∗H )
∂δr∂vj
> 0 and
∂2(θ∗L1−θk∗H )
∂γ∂vj
> 0 for j ∈ {l, h} and k ∈ {r, c}).
The network effect enables the platform to take on the value-driven pricing strategy more aggres-
sively when the likelihood or the magnitude of costliness reduction increases. As discussed previ-
ously, a stronger network effect implies that the platform can more effectively generate revenues
on the seller side given the same buyer-side demand. This encourages the value-driven pricing,
therefore, the increases of the buyer-side prices and the reduction in the total buyer-side demand
across both periods are more pronounced. Consequently, the platform also simultaneously reduces
the seller-side fee to a greater extent.
Recall that Proposition 4 also presents the case in which the increase in the costliness reduction
induces the platform to lower the buyer-side prices in Period 2 for the scenario with cost reduction,
given a weak network effect and narrow quality gap. Strengthened network effect within the range
specified for this case has a consistent effect: The platform would reduce the buyer-side prices less
aggressively. In other words, as the network effect strengthens, the platform would gradually move
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away from the price-cutting strategy and towards the value-driven pricing strategy where the prices
are raised.
The platform’s pursuit of value-driven pricing also leads to more emphasis on the high-quality
product that attracts the high-valuation buyers. It then follows that a stronger network effect results
in shifting more buyers from the low-quality to the high-quality product both intertemporally
and within Period 2. In effect, the demand of the first-time buyers for the high-quality product
increases.
While the network effects experienced by the two types of sellers generate qualitatively consistent
results, the results differ in magnitude. The additional effect that the network effect on the high-
type sellers has on the various impacts is weighted by z, the proportion of the high-type sellers;
and that related to the low-type sellers is weighted by 1− z, the proportion of the low-type sellers.
In sum, when the sellers value the buyer-side demand differently, the effect generated by a certain
type of sellers’ valuation for the buyer side is proportional to the number of such type of sellers.
Overall, the network effect facilitates the strategies of collecting the introductory premium on the
initial product and expanding the market of the high-quality product when more cost reduction is
expected. Our findings offer the economic explanation for such strategies taken by platforms such
as Apple and Amazon. We show that it may not be that the first iPhone/iPad or the first Kindle
were so feature-rich that they justified the high introductory prices, or that the later versions were
so under-priced that they attracted large demand. Rather, Apple or Amazon strategically chose
to forgo some of the consumer demand initially and were able to gain a large consumer base for
the high-quality product, because they may be confident about reducing the production cost later
on and had a seller side (i.e., app developer for Apple and publisher for Amazon Kindle) that
was strongly linked to the consumer side. Their pricing strategies were enabled by the two-sided
platform business model.
The role of the network effect also suggests that, for the platform owners, it is worthwhile to
optimize the interactions between the two sides to strengthen the network effect. For App Store
or ebook markets, it may be helpful to match the consumers’ preferences to the products or even
regulate seller competition. For voice-enabled assistant like Echo, the technology of voice processing
is key to smoothly connect the consumers to the developers/sellers. Increasing the value each
consumer generates for the other side effectively strengthens the network effect, which in turn
allows the platform to extract surplus from the high-value consumers of the hardware product
more aggressively.
5. Extension: Bi-Directional Network Effects
In this section, we extend our model by considering bi-directional network effects such that both
sides benefit from the demand on the opposite side. In other words, compared to the main model
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with the uni-directional network effect, we incorporate an additional network effect exerted by the
seller side onto the buyer side.
Let vb denote each buyer’s marginal utility for an additional seller on the other side of the
platform; that is, vb measures the strength of the seller-to-buyer network effect in each period.
Based on Eq. (12), the seller-side demands in Period 1 and 2 are
n1 =
(1− s) + v¯(1− θL1)
1 + w¯
, (30)
nk2 =
(1− s) + v¯(1− θkL2)
1 + w¯
, (31)
respectively, where k ∈ {r, c}. Consequently, the buyers who purchase in Period 1 obtain additional
utility due to the network effect vb [n1 +α(γn
r
2 + (1− γ)nc2)]; for the buyers who purchase in Period
2, the additional utility is αvbn
k
2 . Hence, Eq. (2) and (3) remain the same as the network effect
utility term on both sides is the same. However, Eq. (1) and (4) are revised as follows:
θL1qL + vb(n1 +α(γn
r
2 + (1− γ)nc2))− pL1 = α(θL1qH + vb(γnr2 + (1− γ)nc2)− γ ∗ prH − (1− γ) ∗ pcH),(32)
α(θkL2qL + vbn
k
2 − pkL2) = 0. (33)
The valuations of the indifferent buyers are as follows:
θL1 =
(pL1−α(γprH + (1− γ)pcH)) ∗ (1 + w¯)− (1− s+ v¯)vb
(qL−αqH)(1 + w¯)− v¯vb ,
θkU =
pkU
qH − qL ,
θkH =
pkH − pkL2
qH − qL ,
θkL2 =
pkL2(1 + w¯)− (1− s+ v¯)vb
qL(1 + w¯)− v¯vb .
By substituting θkL2 into Eq. (31), we obtain
nk2 =
qL(1− s+ v¯)− pkL2v¯
qL(1 + w¯)− v¯vb . (34)
The profit function in Period 2 is:
Πk2(p
k
H , p
k
L2, p
k
U ;θL1) =
(
θL1− θkH
) [
pkH − (β1− δk)q2H
]
+ (1− θkU)
[
pkU − (β1− δk)q2H
]
+(θkH − θkL2)
[
pkL2− (β1− δk)q2L
]
+ sn2
=
(
θL1− p
k
H − pkL2
qH − qL
)[
pkH − (β1− δk)q2H
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from first-time buyers of high-quality product
+
(
1− p
k
U
qH − qL
)[
pkU − (β1− δk)q2H
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from upgraders
+
(
pkH − pkL2
qH − qL −
pkL2(1 + w¯)− (1− s+ v¯)vb
qL(1 + w¯)− v¯vb
)[
pkL2− (β1− δk)q2L
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from buyers of low-quality product
+s
qL(1− s+ v¯)− pkL2v¯
qL(1 + w¯)− v¯vb︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from seller side
, (35)
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Therefore, depending on the costliness realization, the corresponding profit maximization problem
is
max
pk
H
,pk
L2
,pk
U
Π2(p
k
H , p
k
L2, p
k
U ;s, θL1) (36)
s.t.
pkL2(1 + w¯)− (1− s+ v¯)vb
qL(1 + w¯)− v¯vb) ≤
pkH − pkL2
qH − qL ≤ θL1 ≤
pkU
qH − qL ≤ 1 (37)
pkU ≤ pkH (38)
Given that the buyers with valuation (θL1,1] purchase the low-quality product in Period 1, the
profit function (35) in the bi-directional model differs from (13) in the uni-directional model in
the third and fourth terms: the profit from the buyers of the low-quality product and the profit
from the seller side due to the seller-to-buyer network effect embodied in the expression of θkL2.
Anticipating the subgame-perfect strategy, the platform sets the buyer-side price in Period 1 to
maximize the total profit over the two periods:
Π1(s,pL1) = (1− θL1)(pL1−β1q2L) + sn1 + γ[αΠr2(pr∗H , pr∗L2, pr∗U )] + (1− γ)[αΠc2(pc∗H , pc∗L2, pc∗U )]
=
(
1− (pL1−α(γp
r
H + (1− γ)pcH)) ∗ (1 + w¯)− (1− s+ v¯)vb
(qL−αqH)(1 + w¯)− v¯vb
)
(pL1−β1q2L)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from the buyer side in Period 1
+s
(1− s) + v¯(1− (pL1−α(γprH+(1−γ)pcH))∗(1+w¯)−(1−s+v¯)vb
(qL−αqH)(1+w¯)−v¯vb )
1 + w¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit from the seller side in Period 1
+α[γΠr2(p
r∗
H , p
r∗
L2, p
r∗
U ) + (1− γ)Πc2(pc∗H , pc∗L2, pc∗U )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Discounted expected profit from Period 2
(39)
The Period 1 profit maximization problem is
max
s,pL1
Π1(s, pL1)
s.t.
(pL1−α(γprH + (1− γ)pcH)) ∗ (1 + w¯)− (1− s+ v¯)vb
(qL−αqH)(1 + w¯)− v¯vb ≤ 1.
The overall profit maximization problem (39) departs from (21) in the expression of θL1 due
to the network effect in the buyers’ utility. We solve this profit-maximizing problem and obtain
the closed-form optimal prices. Due to the complexity of the expressions, we perform numerical
analysis to derive the comparative statics with respect to the likelihood and magnitude of costliness
reduction.
We test a wide range of parameter values that satisfy the second order conditions, valuation
bounds relationship among the indifferent buyers (0< θk∗L2 < θ
k∗
H < θ
∗
L1 < θ
k∗
U < 1), and p
k∗
U ≤ pk∗H , s∗ >
0, consistent with the approach in the uni-directional model. We consider qH = 10, qL ∈ {1,1.5, ...,9},
α,β1 ∈ {0.01,0.02, ...,1}, γ, vb ∈ {0.1,0.2, ...,0.9}, and v¯, w¯ ∈ {2,2.05, ...,8}. In each parameter set,
we vary δr from 0.001 to β1 at the step size of 0.001 to check how the optimal prices change with
δr.
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Our numerical results show that the analytical findings on the platform’s pricing strategies
under the uni-directional model hold qualitatively under the bi-directional model. Figures 2 and 3
illustrate how the optimal prices change with δr for two different α values (α= 0.78,0.58) but under
the same value for the other parameters (qH = 10, qL = 8, γ = 0.5, β1 = 0.01, vb = 0.8, v¯ = 4, and
w¯ = 4.45). The pricing strategies shown in these figures are representative among all the problem
instances. In particular, Figures 2a and 3a indicate that the platform always raises the buyer-side
price and lowers the seller-side fee in Period 1 anticipating more costliness reduction in Period 2,
consistent with Propositions 2 and 3. When the costliness is not reduced in Period 2, from Figures
2b and 3b, we can see that the platform would always set a higher price for the low- and high-
quality products but the upgrade prices remains the same, as previously discussed in Proposition
4. Figures 2c and 3c show that more costliness reduction always leads to a lower upgrade price in
Period 2. In contrast, more costliness reduction in Period 2 may lead to higher or lower prices for
both low-quality and high-quality products in Period 2.
(a) Prices in Period 1
(b) Prices without Costliness Reduction in Period 2 (c) Prices with Costliness Reduction in Period 2
Figure 2 Platform’s Pricing Changes with Costliness Reduction Magnitude for
qH = 10, qL = 8, γ = 0.5, α= 0.78, vb = 0.8, v¯= 4, β1 = 0.01, w¯= 4.45
Figure 4 illustrates how the optimal prices change with γ varying from 0.1 to 0.9 at the step
size of 0.1 when qH = 10, qL = 8, α = 0.78, δ
r = 0.003, β1 = 0.01, vb = 0.8, v¯ = 4, and w¯ = 4.45.
As the likelihood of costliness reduction γ increases, the platform always sets a higher optimal
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(a) Prices in Period 1
(b) Prices without Costliness Reduction in Period 2 (c) Prices with Costliness Reduction in
Period 2
Figure 3 Platform’s Pricing Changes with Costliness Reduction Magnitude for
qH = 10, qL = 8, γ = 0.5, α= 0.58, vb = 0.8, v¯= 4, β1 = 0.01, w¯= 4.45
buyer-side price in both periods and lowers the seller-side fee. However, the optimal upgrade price
is not affected, consistent with the findings in the model with uni-directional network effect.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the dynamic pricing decisions for a hardware-based platform that
offer quality-improving hardware products. The products are introduced sequentially with possibly
decreasing production costliness. First, we find that it is always optimal to continue to provide the
low-quality product when the high-quality version is released. Second, an increase in the likelihood
or magnitude of costliness reduction leads to a higher buyer-side price in Period 1 so that more
potential buyers are shifted to Period 2. Meanwhile, the platform lowers the seller-side fee. Fur-
thermore, an increase in the likelihood or magnitude of costliness reduction can also induce the
platform to raise the buyer-side prices in Period 2. These findings are in sharp contrast with the
conventional wisdom that lower cost leads to lower price in a static setting. Moreover, the impact
of costliness reduction on dynamic pricing is also affected by the network effect. A stronger network
effect induces the platform to more aggressively raise the buyer-side prices.
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(a) Prices in Period 1
(b) Prices without Costliness Reduction in Period 2 (c) Prices with Costliness Reduction in Period 2
Figure 4 Platform’s Pricing Changes with Costliness Reduction Likelihood for
qH = 10, qL = 8, δ
r = 0.003, α= 0.78, vb = 0.8, v¯= 4, β1 = 0.01, w¯= 4.45
A few limitations exist in the current paper and point to several directions for future research.
First, we have taken the qualities of the products introduced in both periods as given for tractability.
In practice, firms can strategically design different versions of goods and determine the features
to be included in each version dynamically. A future study that focuses more on dynamic quality
choices will be relevant for exploring other aspects of the dynamic pricing question in the presence
of different cost structures. Another interesting extension is to relax the monopoly assumption.
Anticipating more effective production in the future may lead to initial quality differentiation of
platforms so as to target different consumer segments and mitigate market competition. It will be
worthwhile to examine this topic in more depth.
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Appendix A: Proofs
A.1. Period 2 Subgame Analysis
The Hessian matrix for the profit function in Period 2 is, for k ∈ {r, c},
∂2Πk2
∂pkH
2
∂2Πk2
∂pkH∂p
k
L2
∂2Πk2
∂pkH∂p
k
U
∂2Πk2
∂pkH∂p
k
L2
∂2Πk2
∂pkL2
2
∂2Πk2
∂pkL2∂p
k
U
∂2Πk2
∂pkH∂p
k
U
∂2Πk2
∂pkL2∂p
k
U
∂2Πk2
∂pkU
2
=
 −2qH−qL 2qH−qL 02
qH−qL −2( 1qH−qL + 1qL ) 0
0 0 −2
qH−qL
 .
It can be easily verified that the Hessian matrix is non-positive and the second order condition (SOC) is
met. From the first order condition (FOC), we obtain
pk∗H (s, θL1) =
qH((β1− δk)qH + θL1)− s v¯1+w¯
2
,
pk∗L2(s, θL1) =
qL((β1− δk)qL + θL1)− s v¯1+w¯
2
,
pk∗U (s, θL1) =
(β1− δk)q2H + qH − qL
2
,
θk∗H (s, θL1) =
(β1− δk)(qH + qL) + θL1
2
,
θk∗L2(s, θL1) =
qL((β1− δk)qL + θL1)− s v¯1+w¯
2qL
,
θk∗U (s, θL1) =
(β1− δk)q2H + qH − qL
2(qH − qL) .
To satisfy Constraints (15) and (16), we need the following conditions:
max{(β1− δk)(qH + qL), sv¯+ (qH − qL)(1 + w¯)
qH(1 + w¯)
}< θL1 ≤ qH(1 + (β1− δ
k)qH)− qL
2(qH − qL) ≤ 1 (40)
After solving for θ∗L1 in Period 1, we can get the conditions on the parameters.
Proof of Proposition 1 From the above expressions for pk∗H (s, θL1) and p
k∗
L2(s, θL1), we have
pk∗H (s, θL1)− pk∗L2(s, θL1)
qH − qL =
1
2
((β1− δk)(qH + qL) + θL1),
pk∗L2(s, θL1)
qL
=
1
2
((β1− δk)qL + θL1− s v¯
qL(1 + w¯)
),
which imply that
pk∗L2(s,θL1)
qL
<
pk∗H (s,θL1)−pk∗L2(s,θL1)
qH−qL always holds and both the high- and low-quality products
are always offered at optimum.
Proof of Lemma 1 From the expressions for pk∗H (s, θL1), p
k∗
L2(s, θL1), we obtain
∂pk∗H (s, θL1)
∂θL1
=
qH
2
> 0,
∂pk∗L2(s, θL1)
∂θL1
=
qL
2
> 0.
Proof of Lemma 2
∂pr∗H (s, θL1)
∂δr
=
−q2H
2
< 0,
∂pr∗L2(s, θL1)
∂δr
=
−q2L
2
< 0,
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∂pr∗U (s, θL1)
∂δr
=
−q2H
2
< 0,
∂(θ∗L1− θr∗H )|θL1
∂δr
=
qH + qL
2
> 0,
∂(1− θr∗U )|θL1
∂δr
=
q2H
2(qH − qL) > 0,
∂(θr∗H − θr∗L2)|θL1
∂δr
=
−qH
2
< 0.
A.2. Period 1 Equilibrium Analysis
We write the Period 1 profit as a function of pL1 and s by substituting Eq. (17) to (19) into the Period 2
profit function (13). The Hessian matrix for the profit function in Period 1 is[
∂2Π1
∂p2L1
∂2Π1
∂pL1∂ps
∂2Π1
∂pL1∂ps
∂2Π1
∂s2
]
=
[
6αqH−8qL
(αqH−2qL)2
v¯(αqH(2+3α)−4qL(1+α))
(αqH−2qL)2(1+W¯ )
v¯(αqH(2+3α)−4qL(1+α))
(αqH−2qL)2(1+w¯)
αv¯2(α2qH(qH+3qL)−4q2L(1+α))
2qL(αqH−2qL)2(1+w¯)2 −
2(1+α)
1+w¯
]
The SOC requires that v¯ < 2
√
(1+α)(3αqH−4qL)qL(1+w¯)
3α2qH−4(1+α)qL . For notational convenience, let A= 4(1 + α)(4qL −
3αqH)qL(1 + w¯) + (3α
2qH − 4(1 +α)qL)v¯2. By solving the FOCs, we get
p∗L1 =
1
2A{
α3qH(v¯(qH(−1 +β1qH − δrγqH)v¯+ 3qL(2 + v¯−β1qLv¯+ δrγqLv¯)) + 4qH(1−β1qH + δrγqH)qL(1 + w¯))
+8q2L(−v¯(1 + v¯) + 2qL(1 +β1qL)(1 + w¯)) + 4αqL(v¯((−β1 + δrγ)q2H v¯+ qH(1 + v¯) + qL(−4 + (−3 +β1qL− δrγqL)v¯))
+2qL(2qL(1 +β1qL)− qH(2 +β1qL))(1 + w¯)) + 2α2qL(v¯(−2(β1− δrγ)q2H v¯+ qH(5 + 5v¯+ δrγqLv¯)
+2qL(−2 + (−1 +β1qL− δrγqL)v¯)) + 2qH(qH + (−β1 + δrγ)q2H − 2qL(2 +β1qL))(1 + w¯)))
}
,
s∗ =
1
A
{
qL(4qL(2 + v¯−β1qLv¯) + 3α2qH(−2 + (−1 +β1qL− δrγqL)v¯)
+2α(−3qH + 4qL + 2(qH − qL)(−1 + (β1− δrγ)(qH + qL))v¯))(1 + w¯)} .
Combining the above expressions for p∗L1 and s
∗ with θL1 =
p∗L1−α(γpr∗H +(1−γ)pc∗H )
qL−αqH and (17) to (19), we obtain
the optimal prices pr∗H , p
r∗
L2, p
r∗
U , p
c∗
H , p
c∗
L2, p
c∗
U as follows:
pr∗H =
1
2A
{
(4q2Lv¯(−2(1 +α) + (−1 +β1qL +α(−1 +β1qL− δrγqL))v¯) +α(5β1− δr(3 + 2γ))q3H(αv¯2− 4(1 +α)qL(1 + w¯))
+qHqL(−4v¯(1 + v¯) +αv¯(2− 2δrγqLv¯+ 3α(2 + v¯−β1qLv¯+ δrγqLv¯)) + 8(1 +α)qL(1 +β1qL)(1 + w¯))
+q2H((α
2 + 4(−(1 + 2α)β1 + δr +αδr(1 + γ))qL)v¯2− 4(1 +α)qL(α+ 4(−β1 + δr)qL)(1 + w¯)))
}
,
pc∗H =
1
2A
{
(4q2Lv¯(−2(1 +α) + (−1 +β1qL +α(−1 +β1qL− δrγqL))v¯) +α(5β1− 2δrγ)q3H(αv¯2− 4(1 +α)qL(1 + w¯))
+q2H((α
2− 4(β1 + 2αβ1−αδrγ)qL)v¯2− 4(1 +α)qL(α− 4β1qL)(1 + w¯))
+qHqL(−4v¯(1 + v¯) +αv¯(2− 2δrγqLv¯+ 3α(2 + v¯−β1qLv¯+ δrγqLv¯)) + 8(1 +α)qL(1 +β1qL)(1 + w¯)))} ,
pr∗L2 =
qL
2A
{v¯(6(1 +α)(αqH − 2qL) + (2αqH(2(1 +α) + (−2 +α)(β1− δrγ)qH) + (−8 +α(−8 + 3αδr(−1 + γ)qH))qL
+2δr(2 +α(2− 3γ))q2L)v¯)− 4(1 +α)qL(αqH(1 + 2β1qH − 2δrγqH + 3β1qL− 3δrqL)− 2qL(1 + 3β1qL− 2δrqL))(1 + w¯)
}
,
pr∗U =
qH + (β1− δr)q2H − qL
2
,
pc∗U =
qH +β1q
2
H − qL
2
.
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Using the expressions for pk∗H , p
k∗
U , p
∗
L1, p
k∗
L2, and s
∗ and (5) to (8), we obtain expressions for the θ thresholds.
Moreover, we restrict our analysis on the parameter constellation such that θk∗H < θ
∗
L1 < θ
k∗
U < 1, p
k∗
U < p
k∗
H
are satisfied as this case is the focus of our paper.
Proof of Proposition 2
dp∗L1
∂δr
=
αγ((−α2q3H + 4(1 +α)q2HqL +α(2 + 3α)qHq2L− 4(1 +α)q3L)v¯2 + 4α(1 +α)q3HqL(1 + w¯))
2A
>0,
dp∗L1
dγ
=
αδr((−α2q3H + 4(1 +α)q2HqL +α(2 + 3α)qHq2L− 4(1 +α)q3L)v¯2 + 4α(1 +α)q3HqL(1 + w¯))
2A
>0,
dθ∗L1
dδr
= −2αγ((αq
2
H + q
2
L)v¯
2− 4(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
A
> 0,
dθ∗L1
dγ
= −2αδ
r((αq2H + q
2
L)v¯
2− 4(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
A
> 0.
Proof of Proposition 3
ds∗
dδr
=−αγqL(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A
< 0.
ds∗
dγ
=−αδ
rqL(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
dpr∗H
dδr
=
1
2A
{
(−α2(3 + 2γ)q3H + 4(1 +α+αγ)q2HqL +α(−2 + 3α)γqHq2L− 4αγq3L)v¯2
+4(1 +α)q2H(α(3 + 2γ)qH − 4qL)qL(1 + w¯)
}
dpc∗H
dδr
=
1
2A
{
αγ((−2αq3H + 4q2HqL + (−2 + 3α)qHq2L− 4q3L)v¯2 + 8(1 +α)q3HqL(1 + w¯))
}
> 0
dpr∗H
dγ
=
1
2A
{
αδr((−2αq3H + 4q2HqL + (−2 + 3α)qHq2L− 4q3L)v¯2 + 8(1 +α)q3HqL(1 + w¯))
}
> 0
dpc∗H
dγ
=
1
2A
{
αδr((−2αq3H + 4q2HqL + (−2 + 3α)qHq2L− 4q3L)v¯2 + 8(1 +α)q3HqL(1 + w¯))
}
> 0
dpr∗L2
dδr
=
1
2A
{
qL((−2(−2 +α)αγq2H + 3α2(−1 + γ)qHqL + 2(2 +α(2− 3γ))q2L)v¯2
+4(1 +α)qL(−4q2L +αqH(2γqH + 3qL))(1 + w¯))
}
dpc∗L2
dδr
=
1
2A
{
αγqL((−2(−2 +α)q2H + 3αqHqL− 6q2L)v¯2 + 8(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
}
> 0
dpr∗L2
dγ
=
1
2A
{
αδrqL((−2(−2 +α)q2H + 3αqHqL− 6q2L)v¯2 + 8(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
}
> 0
dpc∗L2
dγ
=
1
2A
{
αδrqL((−2(−2 +α)q2H + 3αqHqL− 6q2L)v¯2 + 8(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
}
> 0
dpr∗U
dδr
= −q
2
H
2
<0
dpc∗U
dδr
=
dpr∗U
dγ
=
dpc∗U
dγ
= 0
We have
dpr∗H
dδr
> 0 when:
v¯ > v˜r = 2
√
((1 +α)q2H(α(3 + 2γ)qH − 4qL)qL(1 + w¯))
(α2(3 + 2γ)q3H − 4(1 +α+αγ)q2HqL + (2− 3α)αγqHq2L + 4αγq3L)
or
α >
4qL
5qH
and
[
α<
4qL
5qH
or γ ≥ 2qL
αqH
− 3
2
]
.
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The second condition can further be simplified as follows:
α>
4qL
5qH
and γ ≥ 2qL
αqH
− 3
2
⇒ qL
qH
<
5α
4
and
qL
qH
≤ α
2
γ+
3α
4
.
To sum up,
dpr∗H
dδr
> 0 when v¯ > v˜r or qL
qH
≤ α
2
γ+ 3α
4
because qL
qH
< 5α
4
is weaker.
Similarly,
dpr∗L2
dδr
> 0 when:
v¯ > vˆr = 2
√
−(((1 +α)qL(−4q2L +αqH(2γqH + 3qL))(1 + w¯))
(−2(−2 +α)αγq2H + 3α2(−1 + γ)qHqL + 2(2 +α(2− 3γ))q2L))
or
α >
4q2L
2q2H + 3qHqL
and
[
α≤ 4q
2
L
2q2H + 3qHqL
or γ ≥ qL(4qL− 3αqH)
2αq2H
]
.
The second condition can be further simplified to 4q2L ≤ 2αγq2H + 3αqHqL. To sum up, dp
r∗
L2
dδr
> 0 when v¯ > vˆr
or 4q2L ≤ 2αγq2H + 3αqHqL.
Proof of Proposition 5
d(θ∗L1− θr∗H )
dδr
=
1
2A
{
(−(α2qH((−3 + 2γ)qH − 3qL) + 4qL(qH + qL) + 2αqL(2qH + (2 + γ)qL))v¯2
+4(1 +α)qL(αqH((−3 + 2γ)qH − 3qL) + 4qL(qH + qL))(1 + w¯))}> 0
d(1− θr∗U )
dδr
=
q2H
2qH − 2qL > 0
d(θr∗H − θr∗L2)
dδr
=
1
2A
{
(4qHqL− 3α2qH(qH + γqL) + 4α(qHqL + γ(−q2H + q2L)))v¯2 + 4(1 +α)qH(3αqH − 4qL)qL(1 + w¯)
}
< 0
d(1− θr∗L2)
dδr
= − 1
2A
{
((−2(−2 +α)αγq2H + 3α2(−1 + γ)qHqL+
2(2 +α(2− 3γ))q2L)v¯2 + 4(1 +α)qL(−4q2L +αqH(2γqH + 3qL))(1 + w¯)
}
d(1−θ∗L2)
dδr
< 0 when v¯ > vˆr or 4q2L ≤ 2αγq2H +3αqHqL, which are the same conditions for dp
r∗
L2
dδr
> 0 as θr∗L2 =
pr∗L2
qL
.
d(θ∗L1− θr∗H )
dγ
= −αδ
r((αq2H + q
2
L)v¯
2− 4(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
A
> 0
d(1− θr∗U )
dγ
= 0
d(θr∗H − θr∗L2)
dγ
=
αδr(−4q2H − 3αqHqL + 4q2L)v¯2
2A
< 0
d(1− θr∗L2)
dγ
=
αδr((2(−2 +α)q2H − 3αqHqL + 6q2L)v¯2− 8(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
2A
< 0
d(θ∗L1− θc∗H )
dδr
= −αγ((αq
2
H + q
2
L)v¯
2− 4(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
A
> 0
d(1− θc∗U )
dδr
= 0
d(θc∗H − θc∗L2)
dδr
=
αγ(−4q2H − 3αqHqL + 4q2L)v¯2)
2A
< 0
d(1− θc∗L2)
dδr
= −αγ((2(−2 +α)q
2
H − 3αqHqL + 6q2L)v¯2− 8(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
A
< 0
d(θ∗L1− θc∗H )
dγ
= −αδ
r((αq2H + q
2
L)v¯
2− 4(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
A
> 0
d(1− θc∗U )
dγ
= 0
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d(θc∗H − θc∗L2)
dγ
=
αδr(−4q2H − 3αqHqL + 4q2L)v¯2
2A
< 0
d(1− θc∗L2)
dγ
=
αδr((2(−2 +α)q2H − 3αqHqL + 6q2L)v¯2− 8(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
2A
< 0
Proof of Proposition 6 i.
∂2p∗L1
∂δr∂v¯
= − (4α(1 +α)γq
2
L(α(2 + 3α)qH − 4(1 +α)qL)(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂2s∗
∂δr∂v¯
=
αγqL(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)(1 + w¯)((3α2qH − 4(1 +α)qL)v¯2 + 4(1 +α)(3αqH − 4qL)qL(1 + w¯))
A2
< 0
∂2(1− θ∗L1)
∂δr∂v¯
=
12α(1 +α)γ(αqH − 2qL)qL(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
< 0
∂2p∗L1
∂γ∂v¯
= − (4α(1 +α)δ
rq2L(α(2 + 3α)qH − 4(1 +α)qL)(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂2s∗
∂γ∂v¯
=
αδrqL(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)(1 + w¯)((3α2qH − 4(1 +α)qL)v¯2 + 4(1 +α)(3αqH − 4qL)qL(1 + w¯))
A2
< 0
∂2(1− θ∗L1)
∂γ∂v¯
=
2αδr((αq2H + q
2
L)v¯
2− 4(1 +α)q2HqL(1 + w¯))
A2
< 0
ii.
∂pr∗H
∂δr∂v¯
= − (4α(1 +α)γ((−2 + 3α)qH − 4qL)q
2
L(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂pc∗H
∂δr∂v¯
= − (4α(1 +α)γ((−2 + 3α)qH − 4qL)q
2
L(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂2pr∗L2
∂δr∂v¯
= − (12α(1 +α)γ(αqH − 2qL)q
2
L(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂2pc∗L2
∂δr∂v¯
= − (12α(1 +α)γ(αqH − 2qL)q
2
L(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂pr∗H
∂γ∂v¯
= − (4α(1 +α)δ
r((−2 + 3α)qH − 4qL)q2L(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂pc∗H
∂γ∂v¯
= − (4α(1 +α)δ
r((−2 + 3α)qH − 4qL)q2L(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂2pr∗L2
∂γ∂v¯
= − (12α(1 +α)δ
r(αqH − 2qL)q2L(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂2pc∗L2
∂γ∂v¯
= − (12α(1 +α)δ
r(αqH − 2qL)q2L(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂2(1− θr∗L2)
∂δr∂v¯
=
12α(1 +α)γ(αqH − 2qL)qL(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯
A2
< 0
∂2(1− θc∗L2)
∂δr∂v¯
=
12α(1 +α)γ(αqH − 2qL)qL(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
< 0
∂2(1− θr∗L2)
∂γ∂v¯
=
12α(1 +α)δr(αqH − 2qL)qL(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
< 0
∂2(1− θc∗L2)
∂γ∂v¯
=
12α(1 +α)δr(αqH − 2qL)qL(4q2H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
< 0
iii.
∂2(θ∗L1− θr∗H )
∂δr∂v¯
=
8α(1 +α)γq2L(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂2(θ∗L1− θc∗H )
∂δr∂v¯
=
8α(1 +α)γq2L(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂2(θ∗L1− θr∗H )
∂γ∂v¯
=
8α(1 +α)δrq2L(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
∂2(θ∗L1− θc∗H )
∂γ∂v¯
=
8α(1 +α)δrq2L(4q
2
H + 3αqHqL− 4q2L)v¯(1 + w¯)
A2
> 0
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